This paper studies the impact of fiscal subsidies on the sustainability of China's rural pension system. We first provides an overview of China's rural pension system and explains the formulas used to calculate the pension payments. We then examines how fiscal subsidies, in forms of basic pension, incentive pension, and matching subsidy, affect participation rates and individual contributions. Our study shows that the rural residents' participation rates can be improved significantly by increasing basic pension or by providing incentive pension, but not by matching subsidy. However, none of these fiscal subsidies has significant effects on the amount of individual contributions. Overall, our results imply that incentive pension is an effective mechanism in encouraging rural residents to participate in the pension programs, but current level of matching subsidies are not sufficient enough to improve participation or increase contributions. Our study suggests the needs to increase the fiscal subsides in China's rural pension system, and can provide useful implications in designing the effective pension system for rural residents.
Introduction
China's population is aging faster than almost any other country in the world. In 2030, China will become the worlds' most aged society [1] , and the proportion of the elderly population aged 65 or older in China will double from 10% to 20% in 20 years (2017 -2037) [2] . The elderly proportion of the rural population in China is higher than that of the urban population, with the rural area also aging faster than the urban areas [3] .
Moreover, rural elderly have higher rates of poverty than the urban elderly [4] .
Historically, the Chinese rural elderly have relied heavily on their adult children as the main source of financial support. This traditional informal system of old-age provision has been weakening with the increased rural-to-urban migration flows as well as the higher life expectancy and lower fertility rate since the economic reforms in 1980s. [5, 6, 7] . China needs a sustainable pension system with broad coverage and adequate benefits to provide a social safety net in addressing the needs of the rural aging population. In this paper we study the effects of fiscal subsidies on the sustainability of the rural pension system in terms of participation rates and contribution amounts.
The nationwide rural pension system in China was not established until 2009, when China launched the New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) aiming to provide income support for rural elderly. The NRPS was preceded by several county-level pilot schemes starting in 1986 when Chinese State Council issued its 7th Five Year Plan, which noted that "efforts should be made to study how to establish a rural pension system, launch and gradually expand pilot schemes in line with economic development" [8] . The NRPS has rapidly expanded since its implementation in 2009 and covered all regions of rural China in 2012. Meanwhile, the Urban Resident Social Pension (URSP) program was implemented in 2011 to cover the urban nonwage residents who were not covered by the employee-based pension programs. According Peer-reviewed version available at Sustainability 2019, 12, 186; doi:10.3390/su12010186 million of rural and urban residents have enrolled in URBP with the coverage rate higher than 85%, making URBP the pension program with the largest number of participants in the world [9] . Despite the rapid development of this program, many studies have found that rural residents, especially younger residents, do not have sufficient incentive to participate, and most people who do participate choose the lowest level of contribution [10] .
The data used in our study is from an NRPS subsidy program in Fujian Province of China. Fujian Province, located on the southeast coast of China, is one of the richest provinces in China but with significant intraprovincial disparities largely due to income gap between rural and urban areas [11, 12] . According to China National Bureau of Statistics, Fujian's GDP per capita in 2018 ranks the sixth in the nation, in fact, the third highest province only after Jiangsu and Zhejiang if excluding the three municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Fujian province is one of the earliest provinces to introduce the Incentive Pension in the NRPS program, which will be explained in detail in the next section. Our data is from 2011 to 2013, when the NRPS and URSP were still operating in parallel before they merged into URBP in 2014. The URBP adopted the basic schemes, approaches, and pension benefit formulas from the NRPS, and currently serves as the major rural pension program in China. Therefore, our study with this unique data set of NRPS can provide very useful implications in designing an effective pension system for rural residents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the calculation of the pension payment in Chinese pension system. Section 3 describes the data used in our study and presents the data analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and provides policy implications.
II. Pension Formulas
In this section we will explain the NRPS pension formulas, which still apply to the lump-sum payment to cover the shortfall years. The pension consists of two components -a basic pension component and an individual account with individual contribution and matching subsidy. The pension (monthly) formula is as follows,
where the second part represents the amounts accumulated in individual account of the beneficiary including accrued interests, with r being the One-Year Term Deposits interest rate and T being the total years of contribution. Note that the individual account is calculated in a yearly base but the beneficiary will receive the pension monthly. Therefore, in formula (1) 
III. Data
This paper Table 1 . 
IV. Analytical Methods and Results
We first estimate the effect of fiscal subsides, including bon the participation rates of the rural residents. In our data, we have participation rates for three age groups, people younger than 30 but older than 16 (Age1), older than 30 but younger than 45 (Age 2), and older than 45 (used as the base for age group). The regression model takes the following form,
where the subscripts a is the age group, i is the county, t is the year, and 1 = 1 if the age group is between 16 and 30, and 2 = 1 if the age group is between 30 and 45, with the age group of older than 45 being the base group. The definitions of other variables in this regression are described in Table 1 . We use the interaction terms of age groups ( 1 , 2 ) and the incentive pension provision to investigate whether the incentive pension had different effects for different age groups. We also examine the effects of some basic regional information such as gender ratio, average income per capita, and urbanization rates. Since participation rate is a value from 0 to 1, we assume it follows a Beta distribution and perform a beta regression [19] . The results are presented in Table 2 . Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Our analysis shows that the participation rates significantly increases with the provision of incentive pension. The participation rates of young people (age <30) are significant lower than people older than 45, but the effects of incentive pension on participations do differ among different age groups. People in counties with higher per-capita income and urbanization level are more willing to participate in the pension programs. Not surprisingly, higher basic pension increases the participation rates.
What is puzzling in the results is that, the participation rates decrease with the maximum matching subsidy possibly due to the endogeneity problem.
We now explore the effects of fiscal subsidies especially matching subsidies on individual contributions controlling for the county-specific effects. In our data, we have average individual contributions in each county, which is used as the dependent variable in the analysis. Since we don't have contribution amounts in each age group, we use the proportion of participants older than 45 (EldRate) instead of age group dummies in the analysis. The regression model takes the following form, Table 3 . Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The between-effects regression results imply that average individual contributions in the counties with incentive pension are significantly higher than that of the counties without incentive pension. However, this effect is not significant in the fixed-effects regression when controlling for county-specific effects, meaning that the provision of incentive pension cannot increase the individual contributions significantly.
Increasing the amounts of maximum matching subsidy cannot increase the contributions significantly either. Higher degree of urbanization can increase individual contributions but the magnitude is small. The overall contribution will be lower when the proportion of male residents increases. Average individual contributions in the counties with higher basic pension are higher than that in the counties with lower basic pension.
V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the effectiveness of fiscal subsides in improving the sustainability of rural pension system in China in terms of participation rates and individual contribution amounts. Our data shows that participation rates of rural residents younger than 30 are significantly lower than that of older people. The results suggest that rural residents' participation rates in the pension system can be significantly improved either by providing a higher amount of basic pension, or by providing an incentive pension that increases the pension payment as the number of years enrolled in the program increases. The significant effects of incentive pension do not differ among different age groups, although it is designed aiming to increase the participation rates of people younger than 45. Neither of these two fiscal policies have any significant effects in improving the amount of contributions. Moreover, increasing the maximum amount of matching subsidy have no effect on participation rates and individual contributions.
Overall, our results imply that incentive pension is an effective mechanism in encouraging rural residents to participate in the pension programs, but current level of matching subsidies are not sufficient enough to improve participation or increase contributions. China's rural pension payments in general are less than 10% of per capital rural income, which is significantly lower than the social pension in other countries [lin et al.]. Our study suggests the needs to increase the fiscal subsides in China's rural pension system, and can provide useful implications in designing the effective pension system for rural residents.
